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1. INTRODUCTION
Two of the most remarkable trends in family life of the past 40 years
have been the decline of marriage and the rise in labor force participa-
tion of young women. These phenomena underscore the strength of the
interactions between marriage and labor markets. Becker’s seminal work
on marriage (Becker (1973, 1974)) suggested an approach to understand-
ing such interactions: Becker argued that marriage and labor markets are
definitively linked through the comparative advantages of spouses in mar-
ket vs nonmarket labor, particularly in the production of children.
In a similar spirit, this paper analyzes marital and labor supply deci-
sions jointly with the evolution over time of the wage distribution. Using
panel data for U.S. women, we show that neither the cross-sectional nor the
time-series patterns are due to variation in the time women spend in edu-
cation. We believe that these patterns reveal the interaction of two distinct
economic incentives for fertility delay, one arising from the nature of mar-
riage markets, the other from returns to experience in the labor market.
To explore these interactions theoretically, we develop a dynamic model
of family formation that links marriage decisions and labor supply via the
production of children.
Our basic hypothesis is that the cross-sectional relationships between
household income and fertility and labor supply behavior are related to
differences in the dynamic returns to fertility, and that these returns are
determined by both the marital matching process and the dependence of
women’s wages on labor market experience. To the extent that having chil-
dren consumes time, women may lower their future labor time, their future
wages, and their marriage possibilities. When divorce probabilities are high
and information about future matches uncertain, even married women must
consider the effect of motherhood and labor supply on their prospects for
a possible future outside the marriage.
The strength of the empirical linkages between labor markets and fer-
tility delay can be seen in the results of our analysis of U.S. women in
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We find that women with
higher wages have fewer kids and have them later; women in the high-
est wage quintile have 64% of their children at age 27 or older, compared
to 42% for women in the lowest wage quintile. Even after we control for
years of education, measures of quality such as educational attainment and
wages remain strongly associated with fertility delay. There has also been
a significant change in both the level and the timing of births over time.
Since the 1938 birth cohort of mothers, more recent cohorts have fewer
kids and have them at later ages; the proportion of kids born to mothers
age 27 or older has grown 44%. Simultaneously, the labor supply of mar-
ried women ages 20–26 has increased by 71%, from 758 h per year for the
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1938–1947 cohort to 1294 h per year for the 1958–1967 cohort. Our anal-
ysis shows that changes in the length of women’s education over time can
explain at most about 30% of this pattern of fertility delay.
Turning to our model, the three key margins in child production are qual-
ity, quantity, and timing of children. In contrast to the previous literature
on fertility dynamics, we allow for endogenous marital decisions and solve
for the equilibrium marital matching rules. Although this inevitably entails
considerable sacrifice in terms of the structure of the labor market and of
the life cycle, we feel that modeling the equilibrium is crucial for two rea-
sons. First, the decisions in our model affect the evolution over time of the
human capital distribution, which in turn affects the marital equilibrium.
And second, changes in women’s labor market conditions have direct impli-
cations for marital decisions, because they change the bargaining power of
wives relative to their husbands. To allow for this latter channel, we assume
that the decisions of married households solve a simple bargaining game
between the spouses.
In this environment, women with high wage levels delay fertility more
than women with lower wages because they are pickier than high-wage
men about whom they marry. A woman with low wages is more likely to
marry a high-wage man than vice versa, because the low-wage wife can
compensate for her low wages by spending more time in raising children,
an option which is not available for the low-wage husband, as we assume
that men’s time is not a substitute for women’s time in child production.
To see the implications of our model for cross-sectional patterns of fer-
tility timing, we parameterize the model to match calibration targets for
the 1938–1947 cohort of women in the PSID. These targets are chosen to
pin down the key margins in our model, such as labor supply and marriage
behavior, without building in the pattern of fertility timing of the model. In
addition to the proportion of children born to women over 27, these targets
include the total fertility rate, the income distribution across marital states,
the aggregate marriage rate, and the share of income invested in children.
As a result of this procedure, our calibrated model generates a steady-state
equilibrium which reproduces the most relevant features of the data.
The calibrated model also allows us to run computational experiments
aimed at understanding the changes in fertility and labor supply observed
in the United States over the past few decades. We report the results of two
such experiments. In the first, we raise the value of being married relative to
staying single, to clarify the importance of including marriage in our model.
In the second, we introduce a positive rate of return to labor market experi-
ence forwomen, in the spirit of Blau andKhan (1997) andOlivetti (2001), who
found significant increases in women’s returns to experience since the 1970s.
The main results of the paper are as follows: (1) high-productivity women
in our calibrated model choose fewer kids and delay fertility even in the
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absence of returns to experience in the labor market, (2) increasing the
gains from marriage results in further postponement of fertility, and (3)
an increase in returns to labor market experience for women also results
in more fertility postponement, as well as a reduction in wage inequality
among women. The first two results taken together indicate the importance
of the incentives for fertility delay that arise from the marital matching
process; higher wage women are pickier about whom they marry because
delay is more likely to get them a better match than is the case for low-
wage women. Since the third set of results mirror those observed in U.S.
data, this suggests that the same forces are at work in both cases: higher
wage growth for women who work more increases the incentives for fertility
delay. Overall, we infer from our results that while marriage–market returns
are the principal force behind fertility timing, a significant part of the recent
changes in both labor supply and fertility timing could be due to an increase
in returns to labor experience for women.
Our basic hypothesis, that the timing of fertility is strongly linked
to human capital accumulation, is also supported by previous empirical
research. The time a mother spends on child care and the number of young
children she has substantially reduce her labor force participation, accord-
ing to studies by Hotz and Miller (1988) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1989).
Lower and interrupted participation rates lead to lower human capital
accumulation and lower wages for females, according to Altug and Miller
(1998) and Gunderson (1989). Waldfogel (1998) found that in 1994, mean
wages for women with no children were 81.3% of mean wages for men,
while mean wages for married mothers were only 76.5% of mean wages
for men. Finally, the spread in childbearing ages across education groups
has been increasing; Rindfuss et al. (1996) reported that over the period
1963–1989 it was women with college degrees who shifted their childbear-
ing the most toward later ages, confirming a trend noticed earlier by Mare
(1995) and Lewis and Ventura (1990).
The assumption that household decisions are the Pareto-optimal outcome
of a simple bargaining game also plays an important role in the model, as
it ensures that the utility of each spouse increases when their welfare as
singles increases. Empirical research suggests that the household decisions
of married couples do in fact depend on the outside options of the spouses
in this way, and that the option values depend in turn on the states of the
marriage and labor markets (see, for example, Chiappori et al. (2002) and
Rubalcava and Thomas (2000)).
Our research is most closely related to that of Conesa (1999) and Mullin
and Wang (2001), who constructed general equilibrium models of the tim-
ing of fertility and human capital accumulation. However, these papers
abstracted from the dynamics of the marital matching process, which is the
main force driving fertility delay, according to our paper. Other equilibrium
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family-structure models related to ours include Aiyagari et al. (2000) who
model the interaction between the income distribution and parental deci-
sions regarding marriage and divorce, and Greenwood et al. (in press), and
Regalia and Rı´os-Rull (1999), where income distribution interacts with mar-
ital decisions, fertility, and parental investment in children’s human capital.
None of the above papers considered the problem of fertility timing, how-
ever. Our results are also complementary to those of Olivetti (2001), who
modeled the labor supply responses of women to shifts in the wage gap
and returns to experience, taking demographics such as marital status and
number of children as given. She finds that a shift in women’s wage levels
cannot account for the increase in labor supply of young married women,
while an increase in the response of wage growth to women’s experience
can, a finding analogous to our own regarding marriage and fertility timing.
In the next section, we present our empirical analysis. In the follow-
ing section, we develop our model. We discuss calibration of the model in
Section 4. Our computational experiments are reported in Section 5, and
conclusions are listed in the final section.
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we present an empirical description of labor supply and
family decisions by income, education level, and birth cohort of the parents,
based on a simple analysis of the PSID from 1968 to 1999. The goal of the
analysis is to show how fertility and timing of births are related to wages,
education, and birth cohort of the mother.
Empirically, two basic facts suggest the hypothesis that the timing chan-
nel plays an important role in the recent changes in labor market behavior
and marital status. First, we know that women in low-income households
tend to have children earlier than women in higher income households. Sec-
ond, there has been a significant change in the timing of births, especially
since the 1970s. Women are now having children later than was the case
30 years ago. For white women, according to Hotz et al. (1997), the prob-
ability of a first birth at age 20 has fallen from 17% in 1960 to 7% in the
late 1980s. Rindfuss et al. (1996) showed that between 1973 and 1988, the
age-specific fertility rates declined by 7% for women between ages 20 and
24, while increasing about 33% for those between ages 30 and 34. Indeed,
Morgan (1996) pointed out that delayed childbearing is becoming a more
visible feature of the modern American fertility pattern.
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we first give a simple view of what
we mean by the timing of births. We construct a representative sample of
births, which we call the “childbirth sample,” by taking all the births and
adoptions from the PSID childbirth and adoption history file. This file is
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TABLE I
Fraction of Children Born to Mother Age 27 or Older
Cohort
Variable Statistics 1958–1967 1948–1957 1938–1947
Mother older Mean 0.56 0.49 0.39
than age 27 Std. dev. (1.84) (2.39) (2.27)
N 7283 2555 2048
Average age Mean 26.78 26.06 24.91
of mothers Std. dev. (19.93) (27.03) (24.12)
N 7283 2555 2048
based on interviews with members of PSID households from 1985 to 1999
and contains all the births and adoptions to each member of the panel,
dating back to 1910. As in the analysis to follow, we restrict attention to
those children whose mothers were born between 1938 and 1967. We divide
all births into “early” and “late,” according to whether the mother was
younger or older than 26 years when the child was born.3
Table I shows that the fraction of children born late was about 0.39 for
those children whose mother was in the birth cohort of 1938–1947, and that
this number grew to 0.49 for the children of the 1948–1957 mothers and to at
least 0.56 for the 1958–1967 mothers.4 This is a significant change in fertility
behavior, on the order of the much better known change in the quantity of
children per mother that occurred over the same cohorts. Furthermore, the
youngest mothers in our sample were 32 years old in 1999, so their fertility
was not yet complete; our results therefore tend to understate the degree to
which the most recent cohort of women has postponed fertility. This is also
reflected in the increase in the average age of mothers at childbirth, from
25 years in the earliest cohort to nearly 27 years in the latest.5
In the analysis to follow, we take advantage of the panel structure of the
PSID to relate these changes to women’s wages, income, and education.
Because not all of these variables are available for all the mothers of the
children in the above sample, our data set will be smaller than would be
the case if we were to take the mothers of the above children. To maximize
sample size, our sample is drawn from the entire PSID, rather than just
3This age was chosen so that for mothers in our baseline birth cohort of 1928–1937 about
1/3 of the births occurred in the late interval. The results are qualitatively similar if the cut-off
age is chosen anywhere up to age 30.
4Children are weighted by their mother’s individual core weight for the year in which the
mothers born in the middle of the 10-year interval reach the age of 25 years.
5Observations here are weighted by the core sample weight of the mother; thus mothers
with more children end up with a higher weight in the sample, holding constant their core
weight.
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the cross-sectional core sample of the PSID, and then reweighted appro-
priately to represent a random sample of U.S. women. Our basic women’s
sample is composed of all women from the 1938–1967 birth cohorts who are
also present in the childbirth and adoption history file and have a positive
sampling weight; this yields a total sample size of 3837 women.
Our wage data sample is a subset of the women’s sample and consists of
all women for whom there is at least one observation with at least 100 labor
hours per year. Wage variables are constructed by dividing women’s labor
income by their total hours worked, for each year in which they worked
more than 100 h. The labor income variable we use includes wages and
salaries, as well as business income, tips, and commissions. Hourly wages
less than $5 or more than $100 are recorded as missing.6 Lifetime wages
are defined as averages over all years. Restricting attention to those women
for whom wage data are available for ages 20–26 reduces the sample size
to 2136 women.
The birth histories are compiled from the childbirth and adoption history
file of 1985–1999 and from the PSID individual data set (1968–1992), which
contains birth year variables for the first through fifth children born before
1992. We use these to compute the age of the mother at the birth of each
child. We compute the proportion of “late” children of each mother as the
fraction of her children born after she reached age 27; for women with no
children, we set this proportion equal to missing.
In Table II, we present a basic statistical description of women’s birth his-
tories by cohort for the wage data sample. As we go from the oldest cohort
to the youngest, the table shows a decline in fertility from 2.6 to 2.0 and an
increase of nearly two years in the average age at which women have their
first and second children: women from more recent cohorts have fewer
children and have them later in life. The fraction of women who remained
childless before age 27 increased 97% over the same cohort range. While
the change in fertility is uncertain because the youngest may still have
more children in the future, the postponement of fertility is unambigu-
ous. Furthermore, the average number of children born after the mother
has reached age 27 has already grown to exceed that of the older cohorts
who have virtually completed fertility. Finally, the proportion of children
born after the mother reached age 27 rose from 0.36 to 0.51, very much as
in the larger childbirth sample discussed above. Taken together, the picture
is clearly a very strong move away from motherhood while women are in
their 20’s. One component of this change is a decrease in the number of
children demanded, and the second is a shift in childbearing to the 30’s.
6All dollar amounts in this paper are deflated to 1997 currency, using the CPI. For
1994–1999, the wages are drawn from the PSID 1994–1999 hours of work and wage files,
which are constructed from a broader range of variables, including self-reported wages.
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TABLE II
Timing of Births by Mother’s Birth Cohort
Cohort
Variable Statistics 1958–1967 1948–1957 1938–1947
Total number of Mean 2.06 2.04 2.57
kids Std. dev. (5.94) (6.26) (7.49)
N 1899 1188 750
Age of mother at Mean 24.32 23.78 22.53
first child Std. dev. (18.79) (26.46) (21.60)
N 1566 1044 697
Age of mother at Mean 27.09 26.87 25.19
second child Std. dev. (17.93) (25.67) (24.15)
N 1237 843 607
Women childless Mean 0.44 0.37 0.23
before age 27 Std. dev. (1.91) (2.37) (2.07)
N 1899 1188 750
Number of kids Mean 0.97 0.79 0.79
born after age 27 Std. dev. (4.25) (4.64) (4.39)
N 1899 1188 750
Fraction of kids Mean 0.51 0.44 0.36
after age 27 Std. dev. (1.53) (1.95) (1.76)
N 1566 1044 697
The next table repeats the above analysis by mother’s wage quintile,
rather than by birth cohort. The wage measure is the average over ages
30–40, as this is assumed to be more closely related to lifetime labor income
than the wage observed in the earlier period. Table III shows that women
in the lowest wage quintile have more children and have them much earlier
than do women in the top wage quintile. Thus fertility is 2.45 for quintile
1, compared to 1.77 for quintile 5, a differential of about 38%. The age
at which women have their first child rises over the wage distribution from
an average age of 23 for the lowest quintile to 26.7 years for the highest.
The share of women who have no children before age 27 actually doubles,
from 0.31 for the first quintile to 0.63 for the richest quintile. The frac-
tion of children born after the mother reaches age 27 increases from 0.42
to 0.64 across the income distribution, though there is a dip in the second
quintile to 0.33. However, the overall pattern is one of much lower fertility
and much later childbearing for higher income women.7
7Note that the number of observations reported in the table represents the number of
records in the data, not the weights assigned to each respondent. Hence the lowest quintile
has many more observations, as the PSID oversampled poor households.
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TABLE III
Timing of Births by Mother’s Wage Quintile
Wage quintile
Variable Statistics 1 2 3 4 5
Total number of Mean 2.45 2.20 2.01 1.71 1.77
kids Std. dev. (8.12) (5.67) (6.24) (5.99) (6.66)
N 2155 477 453 388 364
Age of mother at Mean 22.95 22.23 23.55 25.25 26.74
first child Std. dev. (21.09) (20.29) (25.81) (27.43) (29.08)
N 1874 432 399 309 293
Age of mother at Mean 25.71 25.32 26.43 28.55 29.53
second child Std. dev. (22.48) (20.59) (23.76) (25.68) (27.21)
N 1556 344 309 248 230
No kids before Mean 0.31 0.22 0.34 0.53 0.63
age 27 Std. dev. (2.15) (1.95) (2.30) (2.61) (2.61)
N 2155 477 453 388 364
Number of kids Mean 1.37 1.49 1.18 0.77 0.64
before age 27 Std. dev. (5.81) (5.30) (5.58) (5.05) (5.15)
N 2155 477 453 388 364
Number of kids Mean 0.94 0.65 0.72 0.86 1.02
born after age 27 Std. dev. (5.14) (3.86) (4.49) (5.16) (5.73)
N 2155 477 453 388 364
Fraction of kids Mean 0.42 0.33 0.41 0.54 0.64
after age 27 Std. dev. (1.73) (1.66) (1.97) (2.25) (2.24)
N 1874 432 399 309 293
It is quite plausible that both of these patterns of fertility timing, the
changes over cohorts and over wage quintiles, are driven by differences in
education. This hypothesis seems to be supported by Tables IV and V which
show that education and marriage patterns closely track the fertility timing
patterns. Thus the percentage of women who attended college doubles over
the cohorts, while the shares of high school and college graduates increase
from 69 to 83%, and from 11 to 19%, respectively.8 The share of women
who did not marry by ages 27 or 37 both tripled, which makes the divorce
rate growth, from 12 to 19% of women divorced by age 27, even more
significant than it may appear at first glance.
Across the wage distribution, the same patterns hold: the fraction of
women with bachelor’s degrees increases from 9 to 39% of women at the
top quintile, while nonmarriage by age 27 increases from 24 do 29%. The
divorce rate, however, is much lower for the top wage quintiles than for
8These statistics ignore high school completion after age 21, and college attendance after
age 30. A substantial fraction of women in the earlier cohorts appear to return to school after
raising children.
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TABLE IV
Education and Marriage by Birth Cohort
Cohort
Variable Statistics 1958–1967 1948–1957 1938–1947
High school Mean 0.83 0.78 0.69
graduate Std. dev. (1.40) (2.01) (2.27)
N 1105 1040 588
Attended Mean 0.48 0.33 0.22
college Std. dev. (1.85) (2.26) (2.04)
N 1105 1040 588
Received Mean 0.19 0.18 0.11
bachelor’s degree Std. dev. (1.44) (1.86) (1.54)
N 1105 1040 588
Received Mean 0.06 0.05 0.02
masters’ degree Std. dev. (0.84) (1.06) (0.66)
N 1105 1040 588
Did not marry Mean 0.34 0.23 0.11
before age 27 Std. dev. (1.80) (2.06) (1.55)
N 1435 1187 691
Did not marry Mean 0.21 0.13 0.06
before age 37 Std. dev. (1.54) (1.64) (1.16)
N 1435 1187 691
Divorced by Mean 0.19 0.20 0.12
age 27 Std. dev. (1.48) (1.95) (1.62)
N 1435 1187 691
the bottom, suggesting a positive association between marital stability and
women’s human capital.
To assess the relative importance for fertility timing of changes in educa-
tion attainment vs changes in fertility behavior given education, we conduct
a simple experiment. In Table VI, we ask what would have happened to
fertility timing under the following two counterfactual conditions: (1) sup-
pose that fertility behavior had remained constant and that the education
choices of the 1938–47 cohort had evolved to match that of the 1958–67
cohort; (2) suppose that education choices had remained the same, but fer-
tility behavior had evolved to match that of the 1960s. The first part of
the table gives the actual proportion of kids born after age 27 by mother’s
education. The second part gives the timing statistics under each of the
counterfactual scenarios. The proportion of kids born late is much higher
for the second scenario than for the first. If only the education distribution
had shifted over time, the proportion of late children would have grown
from 36 to 41%, while if only the behavior of each group had changed, the
proportion would have risen to 48%. In other words, 70% of the change in
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TABLE V
Education and Marriage by Wage Quintile
Wage quintile
Variable Statistics 1 2 3 4 5
High school Mean 0.65 0.737 0.78 0.87 0.89
graduate Std. dev. (2.18) (2.10) (2.00) (1.78) (1.73)
N 1330 422 394 303 284
Attended college Mean 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.49 0.55
Std. dev. (1.96) (2.14) (2.28) (2.64) (2.71)
N 1330 422 394 303 284
Received Mean 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.27 0.39
bachelor’s degree Std. dev. (1.31) (1.03) (1.66) (2.35) (2.66)
N 1330 422 394 303 284
Received Mean 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.13
master’s Degree Std. dev. (0.69) (0.40) (0.90) (1.21) (1.80)
N 1330 422 394 303 284
Average wage, Mean 12.06 11.15 12.36 13.29 17.29
ages 20–26 Std. dev. (43.90) (31.00) (35.59) (24.11) (36.27)
N 849 348 354 305 280
Did not marry Mean 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.29 0.29
before age 27 Std. dev. (1.92) (1.80) (1.92) (2.37) (2.46)
N 1631 477 453 388 364
Did not marry Mean 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.13
before age 37 Std. dev. (1.69) (1.50) (1.53) (1.85) (1.82)
N 1631 477 453 388 364
Divorced by Mean 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.12
age 27 Std. dev. (1.78) (1.86) (1.97) (1.85) (1.73)
N 1631 477 453 388 364
the late proportion can be attributed to changes in the fertility behavior of
women, taking education as given.
Another way to see this is to consider the regression estimates in
Tables VII and VIII. The dependent variable is the proportion of late
children. In Table VII, it is clear that log wages (lifetime averages) are
strongly associated with later fertility, even when conditioning on the total
number of kids. It is also clear that this effect is much stronger for the
youngest cohort than it is for the older cohorts; the coefficient on log wage
more than doubles, growing from 0.17 for the oldest cohort to 0.39 for the
youngest. Thus it seems likely that the effect of wages on fertility delay has
strongly increased over time.
It is possible that this effect of wages only reflects the fact that women are
much less likely to have children while in school, and that high-wage women
stay in school much longer than low-wage women. Ideally, adding education
to the above regression would clarify this point, but the results can be
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TABLE VI
Decomposition of Change in Proportion of Kids Born after Mother Is 27 Years Olda
Birth No High school Attended Bachelor’s
Row cohort Statistics diploma diploma college degree Late prop.
0 1958–1967 Mass 0.17 0.35 0.29 0.19
0.53
Late prop. 0.49 0.39 0.54 0.81
1 1938–1947 Mass 0.306 0.48 0.11 0.11
0.36
Late prop. 0.29 0.36 0.35 0.68
If Only Educational Attainment Had Changed
2 Expt 1 Mass 0.17 0.35 0.29 0.19
0.41
Late prop. 0.29 0.36 0.35 0.68
If Only Fertility Behavior Had Changed
3 Expt 1 Mass 0.306 0.476 0.108 0.11
0.48
Late prop. 0.49 0.39 0.54 0.81
a Education attainment refers to maximum level attained of these four levels.
hard to interpret and parameter instability may arise from multicollinearity
between wages, attainment, and years of education. This can be seen in
Table VIII, where we add various measures of education to the equation.
It is clear from the results that even after we control for the number of years
of education, there is still a strong association between fertility delay and
measures of human capital. The wage effect is naturally quite a bit smaller,
and indeed it only remains significant at the 0.05 level for the youngest
cohort. However, college attendance, bachelor’s degree, and high school
TABLE VII
Lifetime Wages and Timing
Cohort
Variablea Statistics 1958–1967 1948–1957 1938–1947
Intercept Parameter estimate −046 −163 −3212
Standard error (0.16) (2.71) (60.66)
t value −293 −060 −053
Pr > t 0.00 0.55 0.60
Log wage Parameter estimate 0.39 0.21 0.17
Standard error (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
t value 9.83 6.58 4.47
Pr > t 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of Parameter estimate −002 0.00 −003
kids ever Standard error (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
born t value −133 0.12 −194
Pr > t 0.18 0.90 0.05
a Estimates for age polynomial omitted. Dependent variable is proportion of children
born late.
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TABLE VIII
Lifetime Wages, Education, and Timing
Cohort
Variablea Statistics 1958–19671948–1957 1938–1947
Intercept Parameter estimate −109 −271 7.79
Standard error (0.20) (2.41) (64.80)
t value −553 −112 0.12
Pr > t 0.00 0.26 0.90
Wage Parameter estimate 0.24 0.03 0.07
Standard error (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
t value 5.51 0.92 1.81
Pr > t 0.00 0.36 0.07
Years of Parameter estimate 0.07 0.03 0.04
education Standard error (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
t value 5.46 4.25 3.26
Pr > t 0.00 0.00 0.00
High school Parameter estimate −002 0.08 0.13
graduate Standard error (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
t value −034 2.23 2.20
Pr > t 0.73 0.03 0.03
Attended collegeParameter estimate 0.07 0.18 −017
Standard error (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
t value 1.73 5.19 −275
Pr > t 0.08 0.00 0.01
Received Parameter estimate 0.00 0.19 0.40
bachelor’s Standard error (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
degree t value −008 4.14 4.77
Pr > t 0.94 0.00 0.00
Total number of Parameter estimate 0.00 0.01 −001
children Standard error (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
t value 0.12 0.43 −040
Pr > t 0.90 0.67 0.69
a Estimates for age polynomial omitted. Dependent variable is proportion of children
born late.
graduation are all strongly associated with fertility delay for the middle
cohort, and college attendance fails to delay fertility for the oldest cohort
only. Since this latter effect is estimated while controlling for the bachelor’s
degree, the natural interpretation is that women of the oldest cohort were
likely to interrupt their college career in order to have children.
Turning to the labor market, we explore how female labor supply depends
on marital status, and how this dependence has changed over the three
10-year cohorts from 1928 to 1957. Marital status is divided into three cat-
egories: “single,” which is taken to mean never married, “married,” which
13
means living with a spouse, and “divorced,” which means previously mar-
ried. Marital information is derived from the 1985–1999 PSID marital his-
tory file, which lists dates for legal marriages and divorces and from the
married pairs variable in the family data, which includes domestic partners
who are not legally married. Widows are excluded from the data.
Table IX shows that young married women work much less than single
women but that this difference is largely erased by age 27 for the youngest
two cohorts. Over time, the labor supply of married women age 20–26
has increased tremendously: from an average of 758 h for the 1938–1947
cohort to 1294 h for the youngest cohort. As observed in the Introduction,
this has been commented upon in earlier research, such as Olivetti (2001)
and is usually taken to reflect a decline in the pattern of young married
women leaving the labor force temporarily to raise children. Wages of single
women tend to be higher than those of married women at young ages, but
married women catch up later. We interpret this as reflecting both timing
of marriage (high-wage women marry later) and the selection out of the
labor force among married women (high-wage married women tend to have
higher nonlabor income and hence work less while young).
Table X shows the same data for men. The main point of this table is that
none of the labor supply patterns we observed for women are present for
men. Single men tend to work less than married men, which is the opposite
of the case for women. There has been no trend, either up or down in
the labor supply of young married men, although older married men now
work about 10% more on average than they did in the older cohort. Wages
for single men tend to be lower than for married men, but the differences
in family income across marital status are much smaller than was the case
for women, reflecting both higher wages and higher labor supply of men
relative to women.
Our empirical analysis of a representative sample of the U.S. population
confirms both the cross-sectional and time-series patterns alluded to in the
Introduction. Women’s wages play a key role in both the quantity and tim-
ing of children, and the time trend for recent birth cohorts has been toward
women giving birth at later ages. These phenomena cannot be explained by
women’s education decisions; cross-sectional fertility differences match up
better with household income than with mother’s education, and the shift
in timing patterns over cohorts is greater within than it is across educa-
tion classes. The labor supply of young women has increased tremendously
over the birth cohorts in our sample, partly because women are staying
single longer, and partly because married women now work more hours.
The significance of these statistics is not only that they confirm and quan-
tify the phenomena that we would like to model, but also they provide
targets that we will use below to discipline our model specification and
assess its performance.
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3. MODEL
3.1. Economic Environment
The economy is populated by people who live for five periods, two peri-
ods as children and three periods as adults. Adults differ in their sex, pro-
ductivity, marital status, employment, and childbearing histories. Women
can have children in the first two periods of their adult life. The children
are attached to their mother throughout their two-period childhood and
they make no economic decisions. Adults care about consumption, human
capital investment in their children, and leisure.
Each period there is a marriage market where each single agent meets an
agent of the same generation and the opposite sex. Married couples decide
whether or not to stay married. If they divorce they are considered single
and match immediately in the marriage market.
Each period, one- and two-period old married couples and single women
decide how many kids, k ∈ 0	 1	    	K, to have. Children impose a fixed
time cost for their parents. This cost depends on the age of the child and
on the gender of the parent. Let k1 represent the number of kids who are
one-period old and let k2 represent the number of kids who are two-period
old. The total number of kids in a household is given by k = k1 + k2. Only
two-period old women can have children of different ages. When there is
no confusion we use k to represent the number of kids of any age.
Let x denote the productivity (wage) of a female and z denote the pro-
ductivity (wage) of a male; we assume that these are random draws from
finite sets:
x ∈  ≡ x1	    	 xN and z ∈  ≡ z1	    	 zN
Each period the oldest generation of children become young adults, replac-
ing the oldest generation of adults. The productivity of a first-period adult
depends on the total human capital investment he or she receives during
childhood. The productivity of a second-period adult depends on his or
her initial productivity and labor supply in the first period. Similarly, the
productivity of a third-period adult depends on his or her productivity and
labor supply in the second period. The fact that future productivity depends
on current labor supply decisions is key to the hypothesis that a change in
the returns to labor market experience for women has led to a shift in the
timing of births.
The utility function for females is represented by
F	c	 h	 k1	 k2	 1− l − t − χf 	k1	 k2
	 γ
	
where c is consumption, h is human capital investment in children, l is labor
supply, t is child care, γ is a marriage match quality shock, and χf 	k1	 k2

17
is the fixed time cost of having k1 one-period old and k2 two-period old
children at home. Similarly, for males, the utility function is represented by
M	c	 h	 k1	 k2	 1− n− χm	k1	 k2
	 γ
	
where n is labor supply. For a single male, utility from human capital invest-
ment in children, h, is set to zero.
The total income of a household is represented by Y 	x	 z	 l	 n
, and
per-member consumption is represented by c = 	p	k
Y 	x	 z	 l	 n
 − g,
where p is the number of adult members in a household, k is the number
of children, and g is the goods spent on kids.
Agents observe the match quality γ before they decide whether to accept
or reject a match. Let γ ∈ γ1	    	 γM, and assume that the realizations
are independently and identically distributed with density function 	γj
.
Human capital investment per child is represented by h = H	g	 t	 k1	 k2
.
At the end of childhood, each child will have received a total human capi-
tal investment of  = h1 + h2, where h1 and h2 represent the human capital
investment received when kids are one and two periods old, respectively.
Initial productivity is drawn according to
Prx = xi = x = xi	 and Prz = zi =  z = zi
In the second and third periods, the productivity levels evolve according to
X	xjxi	 l−1
 = Prx′ = xjx = xi	 l−1	
where l−1 is the last period’s labor supply. Similarly,
Z	zjzi	 n−1
 = Prz′ = zjz = zi	 n−1
Note that the dependence of the distribution on labor supply allows for
returns to experience in the form of higher future productivity.
3.2. The Equilibrium
To define the equilibrium for this economy, it is necessary to list the prob-
lems agents solve at each point in time and define the decision rules that
are optimal under our assumptions about decision making. We begin with
the last period and use the value functions defined there to represent the
problems of younger agents. At the beginning of each period, single peo-
ple meet in a marriage market. If a couple chooses to marry, the spouses
decide how many kids to have, how much to work, and how much to invest
in their children. In all periods, we assume that the decision rules of mar-
ried couples are given by the Nash solution to the fixed-threat bargaining
problem, where agents have equal bargaining power. The outside options in
this problem are given by the continuation values of their next best options,
whether that is remaining single or taking a new draw from the marriage
market.
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3.2.1. Third Period
Three-period old women have either no kids at home or kids that were
born last period. The value function for a single woman with productivity
x and k two-period old and no one-period old kids is defined by a simple
maximization problem
G3	x	 0	 k
 = max
l	 t	 g
F	c	 h	 0	 k	 1− l − t − χf 	0	 k

 P	3a

subject to
c = 	1	 k
xl − g	
h = H	g	 t	 0	 k

Let the human capital investment for a third-period single woman be given
by
h = Hs3
(
gs3	x	 0	 k
	 ts3	x	 0	 k
	 0	 k
)
	
where gs3	x	 0	 k
 and ts3	x	 0	 k
 are solutions to P(3a). Similarly, let
B3	z
 = max
n
M	zn	 0	 0	 0	 1− n
 P	3b

be the value of single life for a three-period old man.
We refer to three-period old newly matched couples as new marriages.
A three-period newly married couple can only have children who are
now two periods old. The education decision rules, gnm3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 and
tnm3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
, and labor supply decision rules, lnm3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 and
nnm3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
, of the newly married couple solve
max
l	 n	 t	 g
F	c	 h	 0	 k	 1− l − t − χf 	0	 k

 −G3	x	 0	 k

M	c	 h	 0	 k	 1− n− χm	0	 k

 − B3	z

subject to
c=	2	 k
xl + zn− g	
h=H	g	 t	 0	 k
 P	3n

Denote the resulting human capital investment decision of a three-period
old newly married couple by
h = Hnm3
(
gnm3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
	 tnm3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
	 0	 k
)

Let the values of being newly married be W n3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 for a woman
and V n3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 for a man. These are simply the values of the utility
functions evaluated at the decision rules that maximize the Nash bargaining
product. Given these values, let In3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 be the indicator function
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for the marriage decision of a newly matched, three-period old couple of
type 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
,
In3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 =
{ 1	 W n3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 ≥ G3	x	 0	 k
 and
V n3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 ≥ B3	z

0	 otherwise
 P	3n′

Some agents enter the third period already married. As before, such
a couple can only have children who are now two-period old. For each
agent, the outside option is to take a new draw from the marriage market;
denote the value of this option EW dr3 	x	 k
 for women, and EV dr3 	z
 for
men. They are explicitly defined in the Appendix. Then for a couple with
k kids and a match quality γ, the optimal decision rules, gom3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
,
tom3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
, lom3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
, and nom3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
, solve
max
l	 n	 t	 g
F	c	 h	 0	 k	 1− l − t − χf 	0	 k

 − EW dr3 	x	 k

M	c	 h	 0	 k	 1− n− χm	0	 k

 − EV dr3 	z
	 P	3o

subject to
c = 	2	 k
xl + zn− g	
h = H	g	 t	 0	 k

Again denote the human capital investment by a three-period old, already-
married couple, by
h = Hom3
(
gom3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
	 tom3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
	 0	 k
)

Let W o3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 be the wife’s value of continuing in the marriage and
V o3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 be that of the husband, resulting from the optimal decision
rules. The indicator function, Io3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
, for continuing the marriage
is then given by
Io3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 =


1	 W o3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 ≥ EW dr3 	x	 k
 and
V o3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
 ≥ EV dr3 	z

0	 otherwise
 P	3o′

3.2.2. Second Period
The second-period decision process differs from the third-period decision
process in that there is no fertility decision for single women and married
couples. The value of being a two-period old single woman of type x, who
has k2 two-period old kids is
G2	x	 k2
 = max
k	 l	 t	 g
{
F	c	 h	 k	 k2	 1− l − t − χf 	k	 k2


+β∑
i
EW dr3 	xi	 k
X	xi  x	 l

}
P	2a
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subject to
c = 	1	 k+ k2
xl − g	
h = H	g	 t	 k	 k2

Let the decisions that solve this problem be denoted by gs2	x	 k2
, ts2	x	 k2
,
Ks2	x	 k2
, and ls2	x	 k2
. The per-child investment in human capital made
by a two-period old single woman is then given by
h = Hs2
(
gs2	x	 k2
	 ts2	x	 k2
	Ks2	x	 k2
	 k2
)

For single men, we define B2	z
 in the obvious way:
B2	z
 = max
n
{
M	zn	 0	 0	 0	 1− n
 + β∑
j
EV dr3 	zj
Z	zj  z	 n

}
 P	2b

The decision rules for a newly married second-period couple in state
	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 are given by the Nash solution to the bargaining game P	2n

below, with outside options B2	z
 and G2	x	 k2
. We denote the deci-
sion rules for fertility, investment, and labor supply by Knm2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
,
gnm2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
, tnm2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
, nnm2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
, and lnm2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
,
and the associated values of husband and wife as V n2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 and
W n2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
, respectively. These decision rules solve
max
l	 t	 n	 g	 k
[
F	c	 h	 k	 k2	 1− l − t − χf 	k	 k2


+βEW con3 	·  x	 z	 k2	 γ
 −G2	x	 k2

]
[
M	c	 h	 k	 k2	 1− n− χm	k	 k2


+βEV con3 	·  x	 z	 k2	 γ
 − B2	z

]
	 P	2n

subject to
c = 	2	 k+ k2
xl + zn− g	
h = H	g	 t	 k	 k2

Here EW con3 	·  x	 z	 k2	 γ
 and EV con3 	·  x	 z	 k2	 γ
 are expected third-
period continuation values of being married in the state 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 in the
second period for females and males, respectively. Their explicit definitions
are again left for the Appendix. The utility of being married today also
includes the possible gains from remaining married to your spouse next
period, or getting divorced and taking a draw from next period’s marriage
market. Since this is a new marriage, the threat point equals the value of
remaining single in the second period. The associated indicator function
for marriage is given by
In2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 =


1	 W n2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 ≥ G2	x	 k2
 and
V n2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 ≥ B2	z

0	 otherwise
 P	2n′
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The outside options for already-married couples will depend on the
expected value of going back to the marriage market. Suppose that the
expected values of taking a draw in the second-period marriage market
for men and women are given by EV dr2 	z
 and EW dr2 	x	 k2
 (see again the
Appendix). Then for already-married couples in state 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
, the deci-
sion rules Kom2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
, lom2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
, tom2 	x	 z	 k2, γ
, nom2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
,
and gom2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 are the solutions to problem P	2o

max
k	 l	 t	 n	 g
F	c	 h	 k	 k2	 1− l − t − χf 	k	 k2


+βEW con3 	·  x	 z	 k2	 γ
 − EW dr2 	x	 k2

M	c	 h	 k	 k2	 1− n− χm	k	 k2


+βEV con3 	·  x	 z	 k2	 γ
 − EV dr2 	z
	 P	2o

subject to
c = 	2	 k+ k2
xl + zn− g	
h = H	g	 t	 k	 k2

Let the value of continuing to be married in the second period that results
from the decision rules that solve this problem be given by W o2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ

for the wife and by V o2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 for the husband.
For a two-period old couple that considers divorce, we have the following
indicator function,
Io2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 =


1	 W o2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 ≥ EW dr2 	x	 k2
 and
V o2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
 ≥ EV dr2 	z

0	 otherwise
 P	2o′

3.2.3. First Period
In the first period, the decision process is simplified because there are
no already-married couples at the beginning of the first period. The value
of being a one-period old single woman of type x is given by
G1	x
 = max
k	 l	 t	 g
{
F	c	 h	 k	 0	 1− l − t − χf 	k	 0


+β∑
i
EW dr2 	xi	 k
X	xix	 l

}
 P	1a

Let Ks1	x
 be the optimal fertility choice of the first period single woman
with productivity x. Let a one-period old single woman make the following
human capital investment in her children:
h = Hs1
(
gs1	x
	 ts1	x
	Ks1	x
	 0
)

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We can similarly define B1	z
 for one-period old single men, and W n1 	x	 z,
γ
 and V n1 	x	 z	 γ
 for one-period old, newly married couples, and their
corresponding fertility decisions, Knm1 	x	 z	 γ
. Note that all marriages in
period one are new marriages. The marriage decisions for the matches
between first period single women and first period single men are given by
In1 	x	 z	 γ
 =


1	 W n1 	x	 z	 γ
 ≥ G1	x
 and
V n1 	x	 z	 γ
 ≥ B1	z

0	 otherwise
 P	1n′

3.2.4. Definition
A stationary equilibrium is a collection of value functions, household
decision rules, marital decision rules, and matching probabilities such that
all decision rules are optimal, taking the matching probabilities and deci-
sions of other agents as given, and such that the value functions and match-
ing probabilities are generated by the decision rules.
Definition 1. A stationary matching equilibrium is a set of child
quantity and quality allocation rules, Knm1 	x	 z	 γ
, Knm2 	x	 z	 k	 γ
,
Kom2 	x	 z	 k	 γ
, Ks1	x
, Ks2	x	 k
, Hnm3 	gnm3 	 tnm3 	 0	 k
, Hom3 	gom3 	 tom3 	 0	 k
,
Hs3	gs3	 ts3	 0	 k
, Hnm2 	gnm2 	 tnm2 	Knm2 	 k
, Hom2 	gom2 	 tom2 , Kom2 	 k
, Hs2	gs2	 ts2	
Ks2	 k
, Hnm1 	gnm1 	 tnm1 	Knm1 	 0
, and Hs1	gs1	 ts1	Ks	 0
 a set of accept/reject
decision rules, In1 	x	 z	 γ
, In2 	x	 z	 k	 γ
, In3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
, Io2 	x	 z	 k	 γ
,
Io3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
, and a set of matching probabilities, -1	x
, -2	x	 k
,
-3	x	 k
, .1	z
, .2	z
, and .3	z
 such that:
1. The household decision rules are optimal taking as given the mar-
ital decision rules and the matching probabilities; i.e., they solve P	3a
,
P	3b
, P	3n
, P	3o
, P	2a
, P	2b
, P	2n
, P	2o
, and P	1a
 defined above
(as well as corresponding problems for first-period single men and newly
married couples that are not explicitly defined).
2. The marital decision rules for a given sex are optimal, taking as
given the marital decision rules of the other sex, the household decision
rules, and the matching probabilities; i.e., they solve P	3n′
, P	3o′
, P	2n′
,
P	2o′
, and P	1n′
 defined above.
3. Thematching probabilities,-1	x
,-2	x	 k
,-3	x	 k
,.1	z
,.2	z
,
and .3	z
 are the fixed points of the mappings implied by the marital and
household decision rules.
3.3. Computation
Given the measures of each type in the marriage market, in each period,
.1	z
, -1	x
, .2	z
, -2	x	 k
, .3	z
, and -3	x	 k
, we solved the model
working backward from period three. For married couples, this required
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finding the Nash solution to the bargaining game where the threat points
are the values of life as single. It is well known that the Nash solution to the
bargaining game maximizes the product of the net gains of the participants.
Instead of solving the couple’s bargaining problem directly, we maximized
the weighted sums of the spouse’s utility from marriage, and then chose
the weights so that the solution maximized the product of the gains from
marriage. Since the Nash solution is a selection from the set of Pareto-
optimal allocations, such a weight must exist if the problem is well defined.
Furthermore, provided that concavity of the product is satisfied, which is
the case in our model, then the weight that equates the two problems is
given by a simple first-order condition.9
Clearly, successful computation depends on the concavity of the objective
functions of the weighted Pareto problems. In the first and the second peri-
ods these objective functions contain future continuation utility, as future
productivity depends on current labor. The concavity of the objective func-
tion with respect to labor is maintained through appropriate restrictions
on the functional forms that link future productivity and current labor. We
need restrictions on the continuation values because when a married cou-
ple decides how much each should work, even though one may be better
off by working more and accumulating more human capital, it is not clear
that they are always better off if their partner works more. If the partner
works more and accumulates more human capital, he or she has a greater
incentive to leave the current partner and look for a better partner. Hence,
from the perspective of men and women, the continuation values are not
simple functions of current labor supply decisions. Once we have computed
the decisions, we then update . and -. The solution is a fixed point of the
. and - distributions.
4. CALIBRATION
In this section we describe the functional forms and parameterization of
our benchmark model. The purpose of calibrating the model is to restrict
attention to a region of the parameter space where the average behavior
of agents in the model resembles that observed in U.S. data, at least along
the dimensions that are most relevant for our analysis. Since we want to
use the model to explore the interaction between childraising and female
9Consider an allocation resulting from maximizing a weighted sum of utilities of the hus-
band and wife, ρH + 	1 − ρ
W . When ρ = F−G	M−B
+	F−G
 , the solution to the weighted Pareto
problem corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution with equal bargaining power, where G
and B represent the outside options of the wife and the husband, respectively. This can be
demonstrated by comparing the first-order conditions associated with the two problems.
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labor supply, we concentrate on matching statistics directly related to aver-
age fertility and labor supply, conditional on marital status, as well as the
distribution of the population over marital states. Our basic strategy is to
fix the parameters that can be mapped directly to published estimates, and
then choose the remaining “free” parameters so that the steady state of the
model matches an equal number of statistics from the U.S. data. Where
possible, we take these statistics from published sources; however, in some
cases we report our own statistics, computed from the PSID samples dis-
cussed earlier.
The productivity level grids 	t 	t
 have seven grid points in the first
period 	t = 1
, nine in the second 	t = 2
, and 11 in the third 	t = 3
.
We set each model period to 10 years. We consider the first two periods of
the model as partitioning the fertile portion of the female life-cycle. As we
indicate in our empirical analysis one way to think about these subperiods
is as ages 16 to 26 and 27 to 36. In calibrating the model, however, we
will be more freely interpreting the first period as representing the 20’s and
the second period the 30’s of the lifecycle. We set the discount factor, β, to
0.676, which is the standard annual value of 0.96 compounded to match our
longer periods. The choices of functional forms and the other parameters
are described below.
4.1. Parameters Set Directly from Existing Estimates
The effect on per-capita consumption of adding more members to the
family is assumed to be given by the following function:
	p	k
 = 1	p+ bk
σ 
The parameters b = 05	 σ = 05 are set to the midpoints of the intervals
provided by Cutler and Katz (1992), who reported ranges of estimates for
these parameters, based on their analysis of the U.S. poverty line and other
available estimates.
We assume that the fixed time cost of children is linear in the number of
one- and two-period old children, and given by
χf 	k1	 k2
 = χ1f k1 + χ2f k2	 χm	k1	 k2
 = χ1mk1 + χ2mk2	
where χig is the fixed time cost of an i-period old kid for gender g. For
women, we can set these parameters directly from the results of Hotz and
Miller (1988), who reported that a newborn requires 660 h of parental
time per year.10 This requirement declines geometrically at a rate of
10One can imagine that over time improvements in child care technology will allow women
to spend less time with kids and more time in the labor market.
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12% per year. If people have 16 h of nonsleeping time, in its first year
a newborn takes up about 11.3 percent of a woman’s potential work and
leisure time. Using the facts that a period is 10 years and that the decay
rate of the time requirement is 12% annually, we can set χ1f = 00736
and χ2f = 00257.11 For men, direct estimates are not available, but we
assume the cost in father’s time is proportional to that of the mothers.
Using time use data Robinson and Geoffry (1997) found that in 1985,
men were spending about half as much time as women in total family care
(housework, shopping/services, and child care). Hill (1985) also reported
that married men spend about 40% of the time married women spend in
household work, and about half of the time married women spend in shop-
ping/services and child care. Hence, we set the fixed time cost for men at
half of the values for women, χ1m = 00368 and χ2m = 00128.
4.2. Parameters Chosen to Match Model to Data
To set the remaining parameters of the model, we choose a set of targets
from the U.S. data and pick a collection of parameters such that analogous
statistics from the model’s steady state match these targets. As is standard in
the literature, we choose the number of targets equal to the number of free
parameters. The list of targets, along with the corresponding parameters
and the model statistics, is given in Table XI.
We assume that marriage quality can take on one of two values in a given
period. These values are the same for the first two adult periods and are
given by γ1 and γ2; for the final period, they differ and are given by γ
o
1
and γo2 .
12 The probabilities, 	γ1
 and 	γ2
 = 1 − 	γ1
, of these real-
izations are assumed independent of previous realizations and identical in
each period. Since marriage quality determines marriage and divorce rates
in our model, we set these parameters to match the period-specific marriage
statistics from previous studies. Based on data published by the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, our targets include: the percentage of women age 25–29 over
the period 1969–1979 who were married (83%), the percentage of males in
the 35–39 age group over the same period who were not married (7.4%),
and the average percentage of U.S. women who were married between
11Hotz and Miller (1988) did not differentiate between the fixed time cost and the time for
nurture. Robinson (1987) reported separate estimates for physical and nonphysical time costs
of kids. His estimates for fixed time cost of children were about 3.5% of nonsleeping time per
child.
12Since old couples do not have children, their gains from marriage are much smaller in
our model, and hence marriage quality must be increased on average to keep divorce rates
realistic.
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TABLE XI
Benchmark Economy
Statistics Parameter Benchmark Data
Marital status of population
Marriage rate for the first period (%) γ1 = 0575 83 83
Never married males by the end γ2 = 1575 7.5 7.4
of second period (%)
Average remarriage rate for women (%) 	γ1
 = 04 68 67
Average marriage rate (%) γ◦1 = 05 78 78
Never married women (%) γ◦2 = 12 8 8.2
Timing of births
Kids born in second period (%) ψ = 03 36 36
Fertility
The total fertility rate ω = 0365 2.4 2.4
Fraction of kids born to single mothers ξ = 035 10 10
in the first period (%)
Average fraction of kids ϑ = 03 84 82
with married parents (%)
Income inequality
Income of single females in the first period ν = 05 0.45 0.49
(as a fraction of married females)
Labor supply
Married men in the first period δ = 39 0.44 0.43
Married women in the first period ς = 005 0.13 0.15
Investment in kids
Average income share spent on kids (%) α = 038 14 14
Initial productivity levels
Mean log wages for males λ1 = 105 2.3 2.3
in the first period
Mean log wages for females λ2 = 05 2 2
in the first period
Productivity dispersion in the first period σ0 = 045 0.55 0.55
Wage and labor supply growth for males
Males, wages form 20–29 to 30–39 (%) am = 06 27 27
Married males, labor supply 20–29 φm = 045 0 0
to 30–39 (%)
ages 20 and 54 (78%).13 From the U.S. Census Bureau (1999), we also tar-
get the average fraction of females who remarry between ages 30 and 49
(67%). Finally, given estimates from Schoen and Weinick (1993), we target
13The data on marital status of population is based on several issues of U.S. Census Bureau
publication Marital Status and Living Arrangements (series P-20). The current issues can be
downloaded at: http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/ms-la.html.
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the percentage of women between 1970 and 1980 who were never married
(8.2%).
The production function for children’s education is assumed to be given
by
H	g	 t	 k1	 k2
 =
(
g
k
ψ
1 + kψ2
)α(
t
k
ψ
1 + kψ2
)1−α

We set α = 038 and ψ = 03, in order to match the aggregate fraction of
goods that parents spend on their kids (14% according to Olson (1983))
and the fraction of kids born in the second model period (36% of children
are born to mothers over 27, according to Table II).14
Childhood education in turn determines the probability distribution over
initial adult productivity. Given a lifetime human capital investment of
 ≡ h1 + h2, the conditional means of log wages are given by
µx	
 = Elog	x
 = µz	
 = Elog	z
 = log	λ1λ2

The standard deviation around this conditional mean is given by σ0. We
assume that the effect of human capital investment on children is symmet-
ric between males and females. We further assume that initial productivity
levels 	x	 z
 are distributed log normally and approximated using our grid
points for the initial model period for males and females. We take as tar-
gets the means and standard deviations from the 1988 PSID, restricted to
full-time nonfarm employees. Thus the targets are the mean log wages of
men (2.3), the mean log wages of women (2.0), and the standard deviations
of log wages (0.55 for both men and women). The corresponding parame-
ters are λ1 = 105, λ2 = 05, and σ0 = 045.
We assume that the utility functions have the following forms
F	c	 h	 k1	 k2	 1− l − t − χf 	k1	 k2


= c
ν
ν
+wk
ξ
ξ
hϑ
ϑ
+ δ	1− l − t − χf 	k1	 k2


ς
ς
− γ	
for females, and
M	c	 h	 k1	 k2	 1− n− χm	k1	 k2


= c
ν
ν
+wk
ξ
ξ
hϑ
ϑ
+ δ	1− n− χm	k1	 k2


ς
ς
− γ	
14Aiyagari et al. (2000) and Greenwood et al. (in press) used human capital production
functions that are similar to the function used here. Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) used a
human capital function where the only input is goods spent on children and the spending is
subject to decreasing returns. While these papers attempt to analyze different questions, they
all are able generate a high degree of persistence across generations.
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for males. This implies six more free parameters, which we restrict on the
basis of fertility behavior and labor supply. Assuming each agent has a
time endowment of 5000 h per year, then Table X implies that, in the birth
cohort 1938–1947, married males aged 20–26 spent about 43% of their time
working. Table IX shows that statistic to be about 15% for married females.
We use these statistics, and the ratio of single women’s to married women’s
household income, to pin down the parameters δ = 36, ς = 005, and
ν = 05. Table IX shows that in the birth cohort 1938–1947 the total family
income of single females is about 49% of married females for younger
women and drops to around 44% for women in their 30’s.15
The parameters that govern utility for children are set to match the fol-
lowing targets: the total fertility rate for women between 15 and 40 years
old (2.4, in 1970, according to Ventura et al. (1998)), the percentage of
children born to single women (10%, between 1970 and 1980, according to
Ventura and Bacharach (2000)), and the fraction of kids living in two-parent
families (82%, between 1969 and 1979, according to U.S. Census Bureau
data).16 Finally, we allow each female to have at most K = 2 new children
in any given period.
Although published estimates of the returns to labor market experience
exist, there is no consensus in the literature regarding how to treat the
problems arising from self-selection into work or the endogeneity of the
number of hours worked. It is clear, however, that labor market experience
does raise wages, and that for women this effect became much stronger in
the 1970s than it had been previously. Moffitt (1984) found that an addi-
tional year of work experience raises wages for men by a little more than
4%, and Blau and Kahn (1997) found that an additional year of full-time
experience, in 1988, increases log female wages by 0.0289 and male wages
by 0.0458. However, these studies do not take selectivity bias into account.
More recently, Olivetti (2001) estimated the return to experience for men
and women and showed that there has been a significant rise in the returns
to experience, particularly for females, for whom wage growth between ages
20–29 and 30–39 was not significantly different from zero in the 1970s.
We assume that all wage growth is due to the returns to experience, as
represented by a function that maps current productivity levels and current
labor supply decisions into the next period’s productivity levels. To mini-
mize the need for new parameters, we assume that depending on current
labor supply decisions, productivity can either go up one level, go down one
15For men, the differentials are 53% for the young cohort in their 20’s and 44% for older
men.
16The fraction of kids living with married couples is based on U.S. Census Bureau data
on the living arrangements of children under 18, which is available at http://www.census.gov/
population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html.
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level, or stay the same. For each sex, this process is characterized by two
parameters, as and φs, as
Prxi−1xi	 l = 	1− af 
	1− lφf 
	 Przi−1zi	 n = 	1− am
	1− nφm
	
Prxixi	 l = af 	1− lφf 
	 Przizi	 n = am	1− nφm
	
and
Prxi+1xi	 l = lφf 	 Przi+1zi	 n = nφm
In our benchmark economy, we set these two parameters to match the
observed wage and labor supply growth. For males, we choose am = 06
and φm = 045. This gives a wage growth rate for males between the first
two model periods of about 27% (which is the average value we calculate
for males between ages 20–29 and 30–39 using PSID data between 1969
and 1979). In the benchmark, the average labor supply of married men
between the first two periods is about constant (which matches the data
on labor supply for the birth cohort 1938–1947 in Table X). Olivetti (2001),
using PSID data for 1973, showed that the wage growth for married females
between ages 20–29 and 30–39 was negative. Using the PSID data between
1969 and 1979, we also find that the wage growth for all females between
ages 20–29 and 30–39 was close to zero. Hence, for females we assume that
there is no wage growth in our benchmark economy.
5. INEQUALITY AND FERTILITY TIMING
In this section we analyze the interactions between wage inequality and
the timing of fertility. We show that the marriage market plays a central
role in determining the timing of fertility, as well as in the propagation of
inequality across generations.
The main result of our benchmark model is that women’s productivity
(wages) delays fertility even when the labor market returns to work expe-
rience are zero. This is evident from Table XII, where we report fertility
patterns by the marital status and productivity of the mothers.17 Each cell
reports the total number of kids and the fraction of kids born in the second
model period. Three important patterns are evident:(1) The completed fer-
tility rate is declining in the productivity level of the mothers. Women who
are in the top half of the wage distribution have on average 2.1 kids whereas
17The marital status and productivity levels correspond to the second model period. Hence,
single mothers are those who have never been married or those who experienced a divorce
but did not get remarried. New marriages are those formed in the second period, while old
marriages are the intact marriages from the first period.
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TABLE XII
Fertility Decisions in Benchmark Economy
Fraction
Total number born in the
of kids second period
All mothers
Top half of the wage distribution 2.10 0.41
Bottom half of the wage distribution 2.70 0.30
Single
Top half of the wage distribution 2.21 0.47
Bottom half of the wage distribution 3.26 0.55
Newly married
Top half of the wage distribution 1.88 0.50
Bottom half of the wage distribution 2.57 0.25
Intact marriages
Top half of the wage distribution 2.21 0.36
Bottom half of the wage distribution 2.53 0.18
those in the bottom half have 2.7. (2) The proportion of the children born
in the mother’s first adult period is declining in the mother’s wages. (3) Sin-
gle women delay fertility more than married women, and women in stable
marriages delay fertility the least.
The fact that women’s fertility is declining in their education level is
well known (see Rindfuss et al. (1996) and Matthews and Ventura (1997)
for some recent evidence, and Browning (1992) and Hotz et al. (1997) for
reviews of literature). In our model, this is driven by the time costs of both
fertility and investment in human capital. Children are time intensive, and
thus more costly for women with high productivity.
In our benchmark model, women do not receive a return to labor market
experience in the form of higher wages, because we have set the experience
effect on wages equal to zero for women. However, more productive women
tend to have children later than less productive women. Thus, the lowest
productivity mothers who are newly married in the second period have
about 74% of their children in the first period; the corresponding figure
for the highest productivity level is 15%. The same figures are 78 and 50%
for women who are in an intact marriage, and 45 and 28% for women
who are single in the second period. This pattern is due to the fact that
women with low wages who meet high-wage men in the first period are
more likely to marry than women with high productivity who meet low-
wage men. The reason that matches where spouse’s wages are unequal are
less stable when the woman has the higher wage is that the gains from
specialization are much lower because men are less effective in producing
and raising children.
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The third result is that single women postpone their childbearing more
than married women. Once the second period marriage market is cleared,
however, they have their children. The same is also true for marriages that
are more likely to end in divorce in the first period. Such marriages result
in fewer kids in the first period than those that are more likely to remain
intact.18 These effects arise because becoming a single mother is costly,
both in a pecuniary sense, and in terms of reduced marital prospects for
the future.
This effect is stronger for women with higher productivity, which
explains why high productivity single women delay their childbearing. Low-
productivity women have a lower probability marrying a high-productivity
man in the future marriage market and hence less incentive to wait for
a better match before having kids. In addition, high-productivity married
women are more likely to dump their low-productivity husbands from the
first period and look for a more productive mate in the second.19
As further evidence of the effect in our model of matching incentives on
the timing of births, we also run the following simple experiment: suppose
the match quality levels for the last period of the model are now given by
γo1 = 0 and γo2 = 12. In other words, we improve the match quality for
the last period. Not surprisingly, this increases people’s chances of getting
married in the last model period, and the aggregate marriage rate rises to
84 from 78%. More importantly, on average, about 37% of the kids are now
born in the second model period (instead of 36%). Hence, better marriage
prospects simply lead to later births as we expected.
The human capital of children in the model depends on both the marital
status of the parents and the timing of fertility. The effect of marital status
is due to larger investments of both goods and mother’s time, which is
driven by the fact that the child’s education now benefits two parents rather
than just the mother, raising the return on mother’s time in childraising
relative to market labor. On average a child with a single mother receives
about one-third of the human capital investment received by a child in a
married couple household.20 Empirical support for this sort of interaction is
discussed in McLanahan and Sandefur (1994). In the benchmark economy,
children that are born in the second period receive about 13% more human
capital investment than those born in the first period. These children receive
18In fact this effect of divorce on childbearing is observable in U.S. data, according to
estimates by Lillard and Waite (1993).
19As a robustness check, we ran some experiments with lower fertility rates for single
women, by imposing a utility cost (or stigma) for having an out-of-wedlock birth. Our basic
result regarding the shift in the timing of births with the introduction of returns to experience
for women did not change.
20See Greenwood et al. (2001) for a more detailed discussion of the role of human capital
investment in producing intergenerational persistence of income in such models.
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FIG. 1. Endogenous wage growth for women.
more investment in our model for two reasons. First, women who have
children later tend to be of higher productivity and thus have both higher
household incomes and fewer children. Second, the wage growth of the
fathers increases household income, so that there are more resources for
investment in the later born children.
5.1. Changes in the Return to Experience
An interesting application of our model is to explore the effect on fer-
tility and marriage behavior of increasing the returns to women’s labor
market experience, which were set to zero in the benchmark model. This
change is consistent with other evidence, such as Olivetti (2001) and Blau
and Kahn (1997) who indicated the return to experience has grown much
faster for women than for men since the 1970s. In particular, we assume
that now women face the same labor experience process as men, but it is
parameterized to generate a wage growth rate for women that is close to
what we observe in the PSID between 1980 and 1992 (based on our calcu-
lations using the PSID, from ages 20–29 to 30–39, wages for women grow
on average about 12% during this period).
To match this growth rate, we now set the parameters af = 062 and
φf = 06 in the woman’s function for returns to experience. The effect of
this change on wage growth is depicted in Fig. 1, where we show wage
growth as a function of labor supply. Women who spent 10% of their time
working in the first period experience wage growth of 3%, but those who
worked for 60% of the period experience a wage growth of close to 30%.
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TABLE XIII
Returns to Experience for Women
Statistics Benchmark Experiment
Timing of births
Kids born in second period (%) 36 38
Fertility
The total fertility rate 2.4 2.25
Fraction of kids born to single mothers, 20–29 (%) 10 12
Average fraction of kids with married parents (%) 84 83
Marital status of population
Marriage rate for the first period (%) 83 82
Never-married males by the end of second period (%) 7.5 8.4
Average remarriage rate for female (%) 68 67
Average marriage rate (%) 78 75
Never-married women (%) 8 9
Income inequality
Income of single females in the first period 0.45 0.51
(as a fraction of married females)
Labor supply
Married men in the first period 0.44 0.46
Married women in the first period 0.13 0.16
Investment in kids
Average income share spent on kids (%) 14 12.5
Wage growth
Males, wages from 20–29 to 30–39 (%) 27 27
Females, wages from 20–29 to 30–39 (%) 0 11
The results of this experiment are shown in Table XIII. The change in
the returns to experience for women causes a further delay in the timing of
births. Now about 38% of children are born when their mother is over 30
years, instead of the 36% in the benchmark case. It makes sense to question
if the shift in the model resembles what we see in the data for later cohorts.
As the data in Table II indicate, for the birth cohort of 1948–1957, about
44% of the births occurred to women older than 30 years. Hence, we are
able to explain some of the changes in the timing behavior by changes in
the returns to experience for women. Along with the increase in the delay
of childbearing, total fertility falls from 2.4 to 2.25.
The aggregate marriage rate falls from 78 to 75%. The aggregate frac-
tion of married people, however, does not tell the whole story. What is
happening is that more women choose to remain single and accumulate
human capital in the first two periods (i.e., they refuse to marry men with
low productivity). The marriage rates in the third period are the same in
this experiment as they are in the benchmark. The pattern of a delay in
marriage without a significant change in the aggregate number of people
34
TABLE XIV
Labor Supply
Benchmark Experiment Data
Single men in the first period 0.34 0.34 0.39
Single women in the first period 0.25 0.29 0.30
Married men in the first period 0.44 0.46 0.43
Married women in the first period 0.13 0.16 0.15
Single men in the second period 0.31 0.31 0.38
Single women in the second period 0.19 0.23 0.33
Married men in the second period 0.44 0.44 0.42
Married women in the second period 0.13 0.16 0.24
who will eventually get married is consistent with recent evidence on U.S.
marriage patterns documented by Goldstein and Kenney (2001, p. 517) who
stated that “the major change in marriage patterns has been a shift to older
ages of marriage with only a small decline in eventual levels of marriage.”
Since the timing of births is the key link between labor and marriage
markets in our model, we provide a more detailed look at the labor sup-
ply behavior in Table XIV. The data are based on Tables IX and X. The
first column is the labor supply numbers from our benchmark economy,
and the first two rows are the numbers that are directly targeted by our
parameters. The benchmark economy produces, however, reasonable labor
supply behavior for other marital status and age groups, which is very
encouraging.21 The labor supply numbers for women are higher when we
have positive returns to experience for women. This is not surprising as
women work more to take advantage of returns to experience. Note that as
more women work and choose to remain single in the first period, the rela-
tionship between labor supply and age also more closely resembles what
we observe in the data. Finally, this change results in a more equal income
distribution. Now female-headed households’ labor income is about 51%
of that of married couples for the first model period (as opposed to 45%).
What about the effect on children? There are three channels through
which a change in returns to women’s experience can affect investment in
children. First, it can directly affect time and resource investment decisions.
The direct effect in this experiment is minimal. Second, changes in match-
ing incentives can affect the number of children born to single mothers.
21The singles in the second period of our model, however, look a little different than the
singles in the data. The key force behind this discrepancy is the role of marriage market in our
model. The marriage market selects more productive people into marriages, and the resulting
singles’ pool consists mainly of low-productivity people.
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In our experiment, the fraction of all kids who live with single mothers is
unchanged; however, the fraction who live with young single mothers rises
(10 to 12%). Children born to single mothers continue to receive around
a third of the human capital investment of those born to married couples.
And lastly, a shift in fertility timing changes the number of children born
in the second period relative to the first. With returns to experience for
women, more kids are born in the second period, and they receive more
human capital investment than those born in the first period of their moth-
ers’ lives. Overall, total human capital investment falls just under 4%, so
the single mother effect dominates the shift in timing.
5.1.1. Discussion
The key factor that causes the shift in the timing of births is the chang-
ing return to experience for women. It is important to contrast this channel
with the return to age in order to understand why women delay their child-
bearing decisions here. If, on one hand, the growth in wages was mainly a
result of the return to age, then women would experience a higher wage
tomorrow independent of today’s labor supply. This leads women to have
kids sooner rather than later.22 On the other hand, depreciation of wages
by age, or a negative return to experience, would create a force for later
childbearing. When we increase the return to experience for women, we
get a slightly negative return to age: if a woman does not supply any labor
when she is young, she experiences about a 10% decline in her wages next
period. This depreciation is much less than, for example, numbers esti-
mated by Olivetti (2001), who found that a woman with zero labor supply
between ages 20 and 29, loses about 50% of her human capital by age 30.
Hence, our results are not driven by an implausibly large negative return
to age, and on average women experience wage growth close to the data.
Furthermore, the fact that the actual experience matters most for the wage
growth is also consistent with recent analysis of the effect of fertility and
labor turnover on employment and wages by Erosa et al. (2002).
6. CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to understand the economic forces that cause
women with high lifetime labor income to have children later in life than
women with lower labor income. We argued that this phenomenon is inter-
esting not only for understanding wage inequality over the lifetime, but also,
22Indeed, using the current model, one can generate a decline in the fraction of kids that
is born in the second model period, if all wage growth for females is due to returns to age.
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via fertility and investment in children’s education, for the evolution of the
income distribution over time. Our basic hypothesis was that cross-sectional
differences in fertility behavior and labor supply behavior are due to dif-
ferences in the dynamic returns to fertility. Because both fertility and labor
supply decisions are strongly linked to women’s marital status, we argued
that a deep understanding of these patterns requires a dynamic model of
marital status that incorporates both fertility timing and labor supply.
The main result of our calibrated, benchmark model is that the steady-
state equilibrium replicates the key qualitative features of fertility behavior
in the data: fertility rates are declining in family income and lower-wage
women have children earlier than do higher-wage women. In addition, we
find that increasing the gains from marriage leads to further delays in fer-
tility, confirming that marriage-market incentives are indeed responsible,
in our model, for the cross-sectional pattern of fertility timing. The rea-
son is that matches where spouse’s wages are unequal are much less stable
when the woman has the higher wage as men are less effective in produc-
ing and raising children. Furthermore, single mothers tend to be low-wage
women because their forgone marital prospects are less attractive; high-
wage men are less likely to marry them, and even should such a marriage
occur, low-wage women get a much lower share of the surplus than would
a high-wage woman. Therefore the matching incentives for fertility delay
are much weaker for low-wage women, and hence they have their children
earlier.
Finally, we explored the effect of allowing women’s wages to respond
to work experience, which we took to be analogous to the increases over
the past 30 years in the returns to experience for women, as reported by
Blau and Kahn (1997) and Olivetti (2001). We found that increasing the
effect of labor market experience on women’s wages results in higher labor
supply for young women and a further delay in the timing of fertility; the
proportion of children born to mothers over the age 30 rises 5%, compared
to a 13% increase in the data. Total fertility rates fall by about 7%, and
the proportion of the population never married falls 4%. Since all of these
changes correspond to changes that actually occurred in the U.S. over the
same time period, we feel our results indicate that these changes were due,
to a significant extent, to increases in the labor market incentives for fertility
delay.
Our results suggest that women in the more recent U.S. birth cohorts
perceived that their future wages were more responsive to their labor expe-
rience than was the case for the older cohorts. The causes of this change
are outside the scope of this research but are consistent with the intense
campaign waged in the 1970s against sex discrimination not only with
respect to wages, but also with respect to occupational choice and career
advancement.
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APPENDIX: DECISION RULES
The expected values of having a new draw from the marriage market in
the third period are given by
EW dr3 	x	 k
 = Ez	γ
[
W n3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
In3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ

+G3	x	 0	 k

(
1− In3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ

)]
=∑
i
∑
j
[
W n3 	x	 zi	 0	 k	 γj
In3 	x	 zi	 0	 k	 γj

+G3	x	 0	 k

(
1− In3 	x	 zi	 0	 k	 γj

)]
.3	zi
	γj
	
for females and
EV dr3 	z
 = Ex	k	 γ
[
V n3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ
In3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ

+ B3	z

(
1− In3 	x	 z	 0	 k	 γ

)]
=∑
i
∑
k
∑
j
[
V n3 	xi	 z	 0	 k	 γj
In3 	xi	 z	 0	 k	 γj

+ B3	z

(
1− In3 	xi	 z	 0	 k	 γj

)]
-3	xi	 k
	γj
	
for males, where -3	x	 k
 is the probability of meeting a three-period old
single woman of type x, with k two-period old kids, in the third period
marriage market, and .3	z
 is the probability of meeting a three-period
old single man of type z, in the third period marriage market.
These continuation values for people who are married in the second
period are simply defined as
EW con3 	·x	 z	 k2	 γ

=∑
i
∑
j
∑
m
max
{
W o3 	xi	 zj	 0	 k	 γm
Io3 	xi	 zj	 0	 k	 γm
	 EW dr3 	xi	 k

}
×X	xix	 l
Z	zjz	 n
	γm
	
and
EW con3 	·x	 z	 k2	 γ

=∑
i
∑
j
∑
m
maxV o3 	xi	 zj	 0	 k	 γm
Io3 	xi	 zj	 0	 k	 γm
	 EV dr3 	zj

×X	xix	 l
Z	zjz	 n
	γm

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Finally, the values of having a new draw from the marriage market in the
second period are given by
EW dr2 	x	 k2
 = Ez	γ
[
W n2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ
In2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ

+G2	x	 k2

(
1− In2 	x	 z	 k2	 γ

)]
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i
∑
m
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In2 	x	 zi	 k2	 γm

+G2	x	 k2

(
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i
∑
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∑
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(
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